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STA-rE OF U TAl-I 








STATEMENT OF CASE 
The appellants, on Noven1ber 18, 1932, conveyed to 
respondent the following described parcel of land in Salt 
Lake County, Utah : Beginning at a point 8.7 rods 
(143.55 ft.) South of theN orthwest corner of Lot ~. Block 
22, 10 acres Plat "A"~ Big· Yit>ld Survey, and running 
thence North 4.35 rods (71.775 ft.); thence E.ast 46 rod~; 
thence South 4.35 rods; thence \Vest 46 rods to place of 
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beginning; being the South lh of the North 1;4 of said Lot 
8, containing 11;4 acres more or less. By the same deed, 
the appellants pretended to convey to respondent llJt 
acres of stock of the Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. 
Lot 8, above mentioned, was divided into four parts, each 
46 rods East to West and 4.35 rods North to South; and 
before the conveyance to the respondent, the appellant 
owned the North quarter, and at the time of the com-
mencement of this action, the defendants, other than the 
Yeagers, owned the quarter lot South of what was origi-
nally the Yeager's quarter lot. 'rhere is no evidence as 
to the origin of respondent's title to the land in the quar-
ter lot south of her land except by negotiation with and 
the stipulations of the owners of that quarter; but by her 
complaint in this action she clain1ed, and by the judgment 
herein was awarded, the strip of ground approximately 
46 rods East to West, five feet deep at its West end and 
eight feet deep at its East end, and which was contigu-
ous to the South half of the North quarter of said Lot 8. 
The respondent particularly desired to ascertain the 
North boundary line of her property; and in her com-
plaint described the South half of the North quarter of 
Lot 8 together with the strip above mentioned as one 
parcel. So far as the trial was concerned, and on this 
appeal we shall treat the case as one against the Yeager's 
to quiet title to the South half of the North quarter of 
Lot 8, the parcel first above described as conveyed by 
them to the respondent; and, in this regard , the com-
plaint and appellant's answer described or included tlw 
same land as conveyed by appellants to respondent. 
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The complaint is in the usual forn1 of actions to quiet 
title. In the appellants' answer after describing the land 
emveyed by then1 to respondent, they alleg·e: "That di-
viding the property so conveyed ( i. e., the South half· of 
the North quarter of Lot 8) fro1n the property retained, 
a fence had been constructed by the defendants, (appel-
lants) and was standing at the time of conveyance above 
mentioned and the said plaintiff had been in possession 
of the property conveyed south of the .said fence and no 
part of defendant's land had been in possession of said 
plaintiff"; and, further, "that so far as any conflict 
exists between property described above and within the 
fence line as hereinabove deseribed, these defendants 
deny t.~e allegations of said con1plaint and whole thereof, 
and allege the plaintiff is not entitled to any part or por-
tion of said north half or north half of north half of Lot 
8, Block 22, 10 acre Plat 'A,' Big Field Survey, Salt 
Lake City, Utah.'' The answer contains the prayer, that 
''the plaintiff take nothing by her action so far as the 
property described of defendants and that these defend-
ants have their costs herein expended.'' 
'rhe substance of the foregoing allegation is, we pre-
sume, that there was a fence on the division line between 
t i1e north half and south half of the north quarter of said 
Lot 8; and that respondent ''Tas not entitled to any part 
of the appellants' north half of that quarter. As the re-
spondent was not clain1ing any part of the latter prop-
erty, the allegations of the answer elucidated by the pray-
Pr, contains a concession by appellants that respondent's 
title to the south half of the north quarter of Lot 8 1night 
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be quieted. Indeed, it would not be too strong a statement 
to say, that the appellants joined in the prayer of re-
spondent's complaint that her title to the latter property 
be quieted. 
The defendants named in the complaint, other than 
the appellants disclaimed; and the action came on for 
trial on the complaint and appellant's answer. While 
plaintiff's counsel was making a statement of the case 
to the court, a discussion arose between the court and the 
attorneys, in which the Judge, addressing counsel for ap-
pellants, said: ''The plaintiff wants the land described 
in the deed, no more, no less, and you say they are en-
titled to the land described in the- deed, no more and no 
less" (Tr., 74); and, also, "I do not think you have a 
controversy here" (Tr., 76). The appellant's counsel 
thereupon asked leave to amend his answer, so as to claim 
''three feet on one side and five feet on the other, north of 
the fence described in the answer, and 24 hours in which 
to prepare the amendment.'' ( Tr ., 77.) The court had 
previously stated to plaintiff's counsel, "I will give you 
judgment on your pleadings to that effect-that you 
have the land described in the deed." (Tr., 76.) Plain-
tiff's counsel objected to the appellants' proposed amend-
ment of their answer and the court thereupon said, "I 
will entertain a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
quieting title''; to which counsel for plaintiff replied, 
"We make that motion, Your Honor." The court grant-
ed the motion, saying, ''The n1otion is for judgment of 
the pleadings in favor of the p~aintiff and against the 
defendants, Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager.'' (Tr., 
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78.) The court then addressed the attorney for the de-
fendants, saying:'' Now, that does not bar you, Mr. Cluff. 
You get your answer drawn and if you want to ask leave 
to open the case or file your answer or not, as the case 
may be, you can draw your answer that will give you a 
cause of action." To which Mr. Cluff replied, "I will 
see what I can do anyway." (Tr., 78.) The plaintiff then 
asked for judgment on the answer and stipulation of fact 
and subscribed by the plaintiff and remaining defendants, 
settling the boundary line between the other properties ; 
which motion the court granted. ( Tll' ., 78.) 
On September 25, 1939, within the time allowed by the 
court therefor, the appellants served and filed their 
notice of intention to move for a new trial on all the1 
statutory grounds, excepting to those relating to miscon-
duct of the jury, etc., excessive damages and newly dis-
covered evidence (Tr., 21); and also served and filed 
what is denominated ''Motion to Vacate Decree and for 
Permission to Amend Answer,'' but which really is only 
a notice of intention to make a motion for that purpose 
and specifying the grounds on which it would be made, 
which were: ( 1) That no time was allo-vved defendants 
to file objection to trial minutes as prepared by attor-
lleys for plaintiff as required in Rule 13 of Rules of 
Practice of the District Court of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict; (2) that no time was allowed defendants to mnend 
their answer after motion for judgment of the pleadings; 
(3) that the decree is contrary to law; ( 4) that the de-
nial in the answer is sufficient to raise an issue, and ( 5) 
that the judgment is contrary to law and the court erred 
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in judgment on the pleadings, since in making the motion 
by plaintiff the court (should) have treated the denial as 
sufficient and the case should have gone to trial and 
plaintiff required to offer evidence in support of com-
plaint. (Tr., 22.) 
Both of the foregoing motions were, on October 14, 
1939, with the consent of appellants, by their attorney, 
denied. (Tr., 25, 104.) 
On November 2, 1939, the appellants, by their present 
attorney, Mr. Henroid, served a notice of motion that on 
November 18, 1939, they would move the court to recon-
sider the motion to vacate decree and permission to 
amend answer theretofore filed, upon the grounds there-
in .stated and also upon the grounds of: (Specifying all 
the statutory grounds for motion for new trial, excepting 
those related to misconduct of the jury, etc., and exces-
sive damages. (Tr., 34.) Afterwards, on December 6, 
1939, the appellants tendered an answer, in which they 
alleged, in substance, that at the time of their convey-
ance to plaintiff, a fence stood on or near the north 
boundary of Lot 8, and that there was another fence 
separating the lot intended to be conveyed to plaintiff 
and that intended to be retained by defendants; that 
when defendants conveyed to plaintiff, it was the inten-
tion to measure the property by starting at the fence line 
on or near the north boundary of Lot 8 and that the 
plaintiff accepted the property on the south side of 
second fence, above mentioned, which separated the lot 
intended to be conveyed to plaintiff and that intended to 
be retained by defendants; that the assumption of both 
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plaintiff and defendant that the partition fence was to 
be the true boundary line between the properties, and 
that if said partition fence was not the true boundary, 
it was treated as such by plaintiff and defendants, "and 
if it were not the true boundary line there was a mutual 
mistake''; that measured from any other line (that is, 
the fence on or near the north boundary of Lot 8) di~ 
not and would not constitute the conveyance agreed upon 
by plaintiff and defendants; the plaintiff and defend-
ants at all times treated the fence and ditch as the south 
boundary of plaintiff's property; that for more than 10 
years the defendants have occupied and cultivated the 
premises north of the partition fence, adverse to the de-
fendant and all the world under claim of title based on 
fence line and natural monuments, paying taxes thereon 
for said 10 year.s and the defendants' possession during 
said time has been open, notorious, uninterrupted and 
peaceable under claim of right, u save and exce:pt as 
qualified by the above entitled case"; that the partition 
fence between plaintiff and defendants' properties was 
at the time of conveyance the agreed boundary line separ-
ated the properties, and that said fence was then in place 
and is now in place; that for many years the plaintiff 
treated said partition fence as the true boundary line and 
made no claim to any property north of .said partition 
fence and represented to defendants and others that said 
fence was the true boundary line; that defendants be-
lieved said representations and planted shrubs, cultivated 
crops, and built structures thereon and plaintiff is 
estopped from asserting any claim to the property north 
'1 
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of said partition fence. The defendants also included 
the following counterclairn in their answer: 
That these defendants are the owners and occu-
pants of all the property between said partition 
fence and the fence on or near the north boundary 
of Lot 8, Block 22, Plat ''A,'' Big Field Survey, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; that the plaintiff 
asserts to have some claim or interest in a part 
thereof but the plaintiff's claim is without any right 
whatsoever. 
The defendants prayed that a judgment be entered in 
their favor ''quieting their title to the property up to 
the partition fence herein mentioned, and that a decree 
be entered reforming the deed herein mentioned in para-
graph 3, to conform to the intentions of the parties and 
reforming the description in said deed," etc. (Tr., 47.) 
The appellant, Albert Yeager, made an Affidavit in 
support of so-called motion to vacate the decree, in which 
he attempts to state grounds for the motion, as follows: 
''There was an excusable misunderstanding concerning 
the .starting point for the measurement of said proper-
ties"; "and that any stipulation of boundary was based 
on miswnderstanding"; "that the Court's ruling was 
based on mutual mistake and misunderstanding, on com-
plete lack of sworn testimony and evidence, and consti-
tuted inadvertence and excusable neglect''; ''that af-
fiant believes and states defendants have an affirmative 
defense based on prescription and adverse possession 
which affiant would have asserted but for said misun-
derstanding with respect to measuring points''; ''that 
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the Court's g1vmg judg1nent on the pleadings consti-
tuted accident and surprise because of the misunder-
standing"; "that affiant has newly discovered evidence" 
(of three particulars) ; ''that there was insufficiency of 
evidence to support judgment on the pleadings, there 
having been no evidence introduced on behalf of either 
plaintiff or defendants''; and ''that there was error in 
law in granting motion for judgment on the pleadings 
and refusing to grant defendants' n1otion for a new 
trial.'' 
ARGUMENT 
The appellants have filed an assignment of errors in 
which they except to and assign as error (1) the Court's 
overruling defendants' demurrer, (2) judgment on plead-
ings, (3) trial minutes signed by judge based on hear-
ing September 16, 1939, ( 4) written decree quieting title 
in plaintiff, ( 5) denial of defendants' motions to set aside 
decree and permit amendment of answer, and denial of 
motion for new trial, motion for new trial and motion to 
vacate judgment, February 6, 1940, and (7) denial of 
defendants' motion to amend answer, September 6, 1939, 
and to all other orders (J;nd rulings of the court in said 
cause, made and entered adverse to and objected to by 
Albert Yeager a;nd May C. Yeager, defenda;nts. (Ahs., 
29.) If it is the rule that in the assignment of errors, 
the errors complained of should be clearly designated, 
the assignments numbered :2, 3, and 4, and most, if not all 
of 5 and 7, are insufficient for the reason that they are 
too general and indefinite; and as assignments num-
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bered 1 and 3 are not argued in appellants' brief, none 
of these assignments of error is entitled to the consid-
eration of the court. Blue Creek L. and L. S. Co. v. An-
derson, 35 Utah 61, 99 P. 444; Crook v. Harman, 29 Utah 
304, 81 P. 95; Thomas v. Perry Irr. Co., 63 Utah 490, 227 
P. 225; Appeal on Falkenberg, 73 Utah 50, 272 P. 225. 
In the first case above cited, and in the Falkenberg case, 
it was held that in assigning as error the overruling of a 
motion for a new trial, the grounds thereof as to which 
it is claimed the court erred should be specified; and in 
the other cases it was held that assignment of error 
merely attaching the judgment cannot be considered. See, 
also, Copeland v. Ferris, 118 Iowa 554, 92 N. W. 699; 
Barry v. Barry, 9 Kan. App. 884, 59 P. 685; Ferrell v. 
City of Opelika, 144 Ala. 135, 39 South, 289. 
Originally, about September 25, 1939, the appellants 
filed a motion to vacate the decree and for a new trial. 
The former, owing to the grounds on which it is based, is 
a nondescript thing; but we must presume that it was 
made under Rev. Sts. 1933, 104-14-4, authorizing the court 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or other pro-
ceeding taken against and through his mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable negl~ct. In King v. Superior 
Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501, 56 P. (2d) 268, it was held 
that the ''ordinary ways in which judgment may be set 
aside by court are by motion for new trial, by motion 
made in due time under statutes, by motion at any time 
when judgment is void on its face, and by suit in equity, 
where judgment is regular in form but void for extrinsic 
fraud or other proper cause.'' It has often puzzled courts 
10 
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as to how to classify a particular uwtion, as in Thomas v. 
Morris, 8 Utah :28-1-, 31 P. -1--1-6; but, ordinarily, the ques.-
tion is, whether it is a motion for a new trial, and in this 
case we cannot call the motion to vacate the decree a 
motiDn for a new trial, for the reason that a formal mo-
tion for a new trial was filed at the same time. True, 
Section 104-14-4 conten1plated, as was said in the Thomas 
Case, a case where relief is applied for on grounds (Inis-
take, inadvertence, etc.,) differing rna terially from those 
mentioned in section 104-40-:2, and that the defendants' 
motion does not state such grounds, still we must classify 
it as coming under the former section; although in the 
absence of the motions for a new trial, the motion to 
vacate the decree might have been treated as such. New-
lander v. Rothschild, 67 Ill. App. 288. If the motion to 
vacate comes under section 104-14-4, then it is without 
grounds as it does not allege mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect, for on a proper motion, the 
ground alleged is the one question involved; and, further, 
a meritorious defense must be shown by the answer ten-
dered. Quealy v. Willardson, 35 Utah 414, 100 P. 930. 
The original motions of the defendants were, with the 
consent of their attorney, denied October 14, 1939, and 
on November 2, thereafter, their new attorney, Mr. Hen-
roid, gave notice that on November 16, he would n1ove the 
court to reconsider the motion to vacate decree and for 
permission to amend answer theretofore filed, upon the 
ground therein stated, and also upon the grounds of ir-
regularity in the proceedings of the court, accident and 
surprise, newly discovered evidence, insufficiency of the 
11 
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evidence to justify the decision, and error of law occur-
ring at the trial (Abs., 15) ; but defendants' attorney now 
claims, and the record may show, that on November 18, 
1939, he orally moved the court to reconsider motion for 
new trial to vacate judgment and permission to amend 
and also to set aside the judgment and for a new trial. 
( Abs., 30.) At page 35 of his abstract and brief, however, 
he says: ''This decree was entered on October 18, 1939, 
and thereafter and on November 2nd, 1939, defendants 
served and filed Notice of Motion, wherein they proposed 
to move the court, on November 18, 1939, to reconsider 
the motion to vacate decree and permission to amend 
(Tr., 34), and they set forth all the statutory grounds 
previously set forth in their former motions (Tr., 21 and 
22), adding in 8aid Notice of Motion, however, an addi~ 
tional statutory ground, i. e., newly disc~vered evidence 
material for the applicant, which could not with reason-
able diligence have been discovered and produced at the 
trial'' ; and, further, at page 36 of the abstract and 
brief: "In support of the motions for which said notice 
was served and filed, defendants tendered a verified an-
swer and one of the appellants, Mr. Yeager, tendered his 
affidavit in support of the motions, setting forth reasons 
for having a trial on the merits." It is possible that 
co~sel for defendants had discovered that the notice of 
''intention to move for a new trial stands for the formal 
motion, and the questions may be ruled on., although no 
motion is filed." East v. Moore, 7 Utah 414, '27 P. 4; 
Lund v. Third Judicial District Court, 90 Utah 433, 62 
P. (2d) 278, 282. 
12 
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At the hearing of the latter nwtions, the appellants' 
attorney was confident of his right to ask reconsidera-
tion of the previous 1notions to vacate the decree and for 
a new trial, and that he could file a second motion for a 
new trial, with the right to support all of such motions 
by oral and other evidence. The term ''reconsider'' 
chosen by appellants for their motions manifestly in-
cludes both the rehearing and renewal of motions. ( 42 
C. J ., 520, Sec. 181.) There are distinctions between a 
rehearing and the renewal of a motion, one of which is, 
as stated in 42 C. J., 514, Sec. 161, that a rehearing "is 
not an independent proceeding; but is always to be heard 
on the same notice and the same papers upon which the 
original motion was heard.'' Judge Straup recognized 
this distinction in Luke v. Colen1an, 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 
1023, when he said: ''The plaintiff, however, did not pro-
ceed on the theory of a second application based on new 
grounds, but on the theory of a rehearing and a resub-
mission of the grounds already passed upon and ad-
judged on the first application." As to the renewal of a 
motion, it has been said: "The necessity for obtaining 
leave to renew a motion depends on the reasons for 
which the renewal is sought, usually whether the renewal 
motion is based on the same or on a new state of facts,~ 
. . . Want of leave to renew a motion in a case where 
leave is necessary is a sufficient ground for denying this 
renewal motion and it has been held to be reversible error 
to grant such a motion but if the order is granted it is 
not void, because the rule requiring leave to renew is 
merely one of practice and may be disregarded by the 
13 
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court." 42 C. J. 518, Sec. 176. And in the same text, 
page 719, Sec. 177, it is said: "Notwithstanding the de-
cision of a motion may not operate strictly as res judicata, 
it will ordinarily be considered as conclusive to the ex-
tent of barring this renewal of the same or a similar 
motion once denied on the merits based on the same or 
similar facts, either before the same or before a differ-
ent judge unless leave of court is obtained to present the 
same matter again, the renewal of .such a motion being 
not of right but merely a matter of grace which as re-
peatedly said, should be 'rarely' or 'sparingly' granted." 
Also, ''such a second motion should not be allowed where 
it would result in permitting a party to bring forward his 
objections by installments, without any excuse foc not 
presenting all his objections upon the former motion" 
(Sec. 183); for, in such a case the decision or order is 
res judicata. Van Fleet's former adjudication, 102, Sec. 
19; Rogers v. McCord-Collins Mere. Co., 19 Okla. 115, 
91 P. 864; Winstone v. Winstone, 40 Wash. 272, 82 P. 
268; Bernard v. Idaho Bank, Etc. Co., 21 Idaho 598, 123 
P. 481; Ann. Cas. 1913E. 120; Harper v. Hildreth, 99 Cal. 
265, 33 P. 1103; King v. Pony Gold Min. Co., 24 Mont. 
470, 62 P. 783. 
In appellants' brief, pages 43-48, their attorney lame-
ly argues that the party aggrieved by the court's deci-
sion on a motion may thereafter make motions for rehear-
ing or file new motions of the same character, provided 
he presents additional grounds or new evidence, citing 
Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023, and Lund v. 
Third Judicial District Court, 90 Utah 433, 62 P. (2d) 
14 
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27S. It is hard to ~t>l' how these cases can be distorted to 
fit that contention. In the Lund case, all previous Utah 
eases, including Luke Y. Coleman, were reviewed and the 
court held, (1) that "but one motion upon the statutory 
grounds for a new trial rna~· be n1ade in pursuance of the 
statute providing for motion for new trial," and (2) that 
·'a motion for new trial may not after the time for filing 
a motion for new trial has expired (section 104-40-4) be 
amended by adding thereto a new or additional ground 
not specified in the original motion but included in the 
.~Tounds ~pecified in section 104-40-2 ''; and the court 
stated, that in Luke v. Colen1an "the court held that a 
rehearing of a motion for a new trial was a proceeding 
unknown to our practice and that the trial court had no 
power to reopen the question of granting or denying a 
motion for a new trial after disposing of it.'' The pro-
ceeding in question in the Lund case was not a new or 
amended n1otion for a new trial, but a motion to set aside 
a judgment under Section 104-14-4, which provides, that 
"\Vhen, for any reason, satisfactory to the court or judge 
thereof, the party aggrieved has failed to apply for a 
new trial or other relief sought during the term at which 
Rnch judgment, order or proceeding complained of was 
taken, the court, or judge thereof in vacation, may grant 
the relief upon application made within a reasonable 
time, not exceeding six months after the 1naking or oc-
currence of the judg1nent, order or other proceeding 
soug-ht to be relieved from"; and the court, ,,·ith that 
prO\·isiou in mind, said: 
The party applying for relief under that section 
mu::;t do 1nore than merely nwve the court to act and 
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file the necessary affidavits required to be filed 
in support of the motion for a new trial, as provided 
for by .section 104-40-4, Supra. The applicant must 
produce proper evidence upon which the court can 
base findings, that through no fault of his he was 
prevented from filing n notice of motion for a new 
trial within the time fixed by the statute and pro-
duce satisfactory evidence why he did not apply for 
an extension of time at some time within the statu-
tory limitation. 
We contend, however, that the court's action in grant-
ing judgm'ent on the pleadings in the present case cannot 
be assigned as ground for a new trial, as it is not an 
error of law occurring during the progress of the trial. 
It was so held in Powder River Cattle Co. v. Custer 
County Com 'rs, 9 Mont. 145, 22 P. 383, and in Ayotte v. 
Nadeau, 32 Mont. 498, 81 P. 145. The court's granting 
a motion for judgment prevents a trial, and a motion for 
a new trial is only proper where there has been a trial. 
Thomas v. Morris, 8 Utah 284, 31 P. 446. The statute, 
section 104-40-1, provides tiiat "a new trial" is a re-
examination of an issue of fact in the same court after 
a trial and decision by a jury, court, judicial officer or 
referee." In Stockton Iron \Yorks v. Walter, 18 Cal. 
App. 373, 123 U. 240, it was held that "trial" as used in 
Cal. Code Civ. Prac. Sec. 656, declaring that a new trial 
is a re-examination of an issue of fact by the same court · 
after a trial and decision by jury or court, refers to an 
investigation of the issues of fact raised by the plead-
ings.'' And see, People v. Bank, 15:2 Cal. ~Gl, 9:2 P. 481. 
Buckhouse v. Parsons, 60 Mont. 156, 198 P. 444. A state-
rnent in James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 
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wherein Judge Frick said that "a party had the un-
qualified right to move for a IH'w trial in e\·ery case,'' 
might be misleading; but the cases cited by this judge 
show that he meant after a trial. In Cella v. Chicago and 
\Y. I. R. Co., ~17 Ill. 326, 75 N. E·. 373, it was held that 
errors regarding motions upon pleadings, or other mat-
ters arising before the trial is entered upon, are not 
ground for motion for a new trial, adding that suc:b 
motion only reaches errors occurring during the course 
of the trial. In Abbey Land & Improvement Co. v. San 
Mateo County, 167 Cal. 434, 139 P. 1068, 52 L. R. (N. S.) 
408, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 804, it was held that a motion for 
new trial cannot be entertained where the cause was sub-
mitted on the pleadings. In Beach v. Spokane Ranch & 
Water Co., 21 :Mont. 7, 5:2 P. 560, it was held that a mo-
tion which does not ask for a decision on an issue of 
fact arising on the pleadings is not the subject of a new 
trial. A motion for a new trial is not a proper proceed-
ing to review the action of the court in giving judgment, 
where no issue of fact was tried (Younger v. Moore, 8 
Cal. App. 237, 96 P. 1093) and, for this reason, the trial 
court's rulings on demurrers to and motions respecting 
pleadings are not proper grounds for new trial. Gray v. 
James, 100 Ind. App. 257, 194 N. E. 203; Bone v. Hayes, 
134 CaL 759, 99 P. 17:2; Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 328, 
23 P. 71. The last four paragraphs of :Mr. Yeager's af-
fidavit (Abs., 28) show the absurdity of attempting to 
·apply the grounds of motion for a new trial to a case 
which was decided on a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings for lack of issue. 
17 
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The answer did not deny the allegations, even argu-
mentatively, as by alleging title in the appellants; the 
answer admitted the conveyance by appellants to re-
spondent of the South lh of the North ~4 of Lot 8, de-
scribing it by metes and bounds, and alleged that divid-
ing that parcel from the North half of the lot was a fence, 
meaning, of course, that the fence extended west to east 
through the middle of said north 1,4, and alleged that so 
far as any conflict exists between the property con-
veyed to respondent and within the fence line, the ap-
pellants denied the allegations of the complaint. If the 
fence was in the middle of said north quarter, right on 
the north boundary line of the land sold to respondent, 
it is hard to see how "any conflict exists between prop-
erty described above and within the fence line as here-
inabove described.'' Whatever that may mean. Ac-
cording to the answer, there was no disputed area. The 
proposed amended answer contained many statements 
a.s to the intentions and &ssumptions of the parties re-
garding the true north boundary line of the parcel of 
land conveyed by appellants to respondent, and they 
audaciously allege that the respondent "represented" to 
appellants her vendors, that the fence was "on or near" 
the median line, east to west of the north quarter of Lot 
8; and although a reformation of the appellants' deed to 
respondent is asked, there is no allegation as to what the 
agreement between thmn was. While the amended an-
swer indicates that appellants do not yet know that 
there is an area between the fence m,entioned athl tlw 
north boundary line given in their deed to respondent, 
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they claim title to it by adverse possession, and as that 
this title be quieted, although appellants conveyed to re-
spondent November 18, 1932. In this case, the answer 
does not show title by adverse possession; nor does it 
show estoppel. Neither does the an1ended answer show 
that the North boundary line of plaintiff's land was dis-
puted or unknown. It may be that the appellants, or 
one of them, stated that the fence on or near the north 
boundary line of respondent's parcel was the true divid-
ing line between their lands; although appellants do not 
make such contention, but such a statement, although re-
spondents appeared to accept it, would not bind either 
of the parties. DeLong v. Baldwin, 111 Mich. 466, 69 N. 
W. 831; Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061; 
Hall v. Davis, 122 Ga. 252, 50 S. E. 106; Crawford v. 
Roloson, 256 Mass. 331, 152 N. E. 319; Cornell v. Jack-
son, 9 Met. (lviass.) 150; Trussel v. Lewis, 13 Neb. 415, 
14 N. 'N. 155, 42 Am. Rep. 767; Cummings v. Williams 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 260 S. W. 845; Purtle v. Bell, 225 Ill. 
5~3, 80 N. E. 350; Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362, 77 N. 
E. 550; McAfferty v. Conover, 70 Ohio St. 99, 70 Am. 
Dec. 57; Mcl{inney v. Doane, 155 Mo. 287, 59 S. W. 304; 
Hatfield v. Workman, 35 vV. Va. 586, 14 S. E. 153; 
Miner v. New York, 5 Jones & S. (N.Y.) 171; Bemis v 
Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 A. 593, 69 A. L. R. 1399. The 
above eases are reviewed in 69 A. L. R. at pages 1449, 
1452, 1455, 1478, 1487, 1488, 1489, of the annotation. At 
pagP 1481 of that annotation quoting from Davison v. 
l~idwnl~ ('rex. CiY. App.) 38 S. \V. 374, it is said: "The 
mere statement that the line is at a particular place does 
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not, of itself, constitute an agreement that it shall be 
there, or bind the parties when the error of the statement 
is discovered''; and at page 1487 of the annotation, quot-
ing 4 R. C. L. 131, it is said: "It has been held that an 
agreement fixing a boundary line under the belief that it 
is the true boundary line when in fact it is not, is not 
binding, and may be set aside by either party when the 
mistake is discovered, unless there is some estoppel 
which prevents it, as where the right of innocent third 
persons has intervened. See, also, Tripp v. Bagley, 74 
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417. A purchaser is 
entitled to the land up to the lines called for in his deed, no 
more, no less, unless as in Binford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 457, 
126 P. 333, and Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 
187 P. 437, there is a surplus of land. 
The question of pleading, in a case of this character, 
seems to be well settled in Utah. Warren v. Mazzuchi, 
45 Utah 612, 148 P. 360; Blackham v. Olsen, 51 Utah 
124, 169 P. 156; Bartholomew v. Richett, 51 Utah 312, 
170 P. 65; Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 468, 50 P. (2d) 
273. In the latter case, the court held : ''Locating of 
building or fence or other structure that may later take 
on nature of mo1;1ument in absence of, or without knowl-
edge of, adjoining owner, or upon supposition that such 
location is true boundary line when in fact it is not, and 
when no express agreement or long acquiescence is shown 
does not establish boundary line different from true 
one'' ; and evidence as to long acquiescence in practical 
boundary line consisting of trees and fences was held 
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insufficient to overturn true boundary line as. established 
by muniments of title. 
On the occasion when the motion for judg1nent on 
the pleadings was granted, appellants' attorney asked 
leave to file an amendment to the complaint so as to 
claim ''three feet on one side and five feet on the other,'' 
which obviously, is the equivalent of the strip apparently 
claimed by respondent in the parcel south of the land 
purchased from appellants. Although this may have been 
a specious claim, the court refused to accede to that 
bare request but clearly stated that if the appellants 
asked to reopen the case and tendered a proper answer, 
the motion ·would be granted. The appellants, by a 
peculiar motion, asked to reopen the case, but did not 
tender an amended answer; and subsequently consented 
that the motion might be denied. Under these circum-
stances, the appellants cannot c-omplain that they were 
not given an opportunity to amend by making an issue 
of some kind. We believe courts should be liberal in 
allowing an1endments to a complaint in the face of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Perhaps the re-
spondent, under her general allegation of title, would 
not have been permitted to prove the establishment of the 
south boundary line of her land by acquiescence or 
agreement if it trenched upon the land of her neighbors 
to the south. However, if the latter thoughtlessly dis-
claimed any interest in this strip and consented that a 
decree might be entered in favor of the respondent, we 
do not see why the appellants should profit b~· the mis-
take and concession, which has .since spoiled a sale of the 
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parcel of land to the south. The last statement is outside 
the record, as is the following: That respondent never 
claimed any right there except that conveyed to her by 
appellants, and so advised her counsel; but at their in-
sistence, the strip in question remained a part of the sub-
ject matter of the complaint and was included in the 
judgment. So far as respondent is concerned, it will be 
restored to the rightful owners. 
vV e believe the record does not disclose any of the 
Prrors assigned and that judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARLEY P. JENSON, 
Attorney for Re8pnudruf. 
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